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Modena 1182, the origins of a new paradigm of ownership 
The interface between historical contingency and the scholarly invention of legal categories 
 
 
Emanuele Conte 
Università Roma Tre 
 
Abstract 
The legal phrase dominium utile is commonly known to express the property rights enjoyed by the person to whom a 
piece of land has been granted in fief or under other similar concessions. A considerable amount of legal-historical 
research has been spent on the origins, the reasons and effects of this legal concept, which proved to have played a very 
significant role in European history. One of the results of this historical research was that the first jurist who introduced 
the expression dominium utile was Pillius de Medicina, a law professor who moved from Bologna to the new born 
school of Modena in 1180. This article aims at an historical recontextualization of Pillius’ doctrinal construct in the 
frame of the political and social history of the city of Modena. However, this contingency of a doctrinal invention does 
not prevent a legal theory from transcend its particular circumstances to remain part of the tool-box which can be used 
by intellectuals in a completely different historical context, perhaps very remote from time and place of their first 
origins. 
 
Keywords 
Medieval property, Dominium utile, Pillius de Medicina, Statutory law, Medieval legal doctrines  
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Dominium utile. 2. Pillius de Medicina and the birth of the dominium utile. 3. The 
historical context of doctrinal innovations. 4. The legal rule within and outside its historical context  
 
 
1. Dominium utile  
 
Is this the case of “chasing a chimera”? In an article published in 19981, Robert Feenstra revisited 
one of the central themes of his scholarly work, on which he had at the time already spent more than 
thirty years of his research2. The theme was that of the dominium utile, one of the boldest devices 
designed by Medieval legal scholarship, and at the same time one of the most important conceptual 
tools which made it possible to secure a legal grip on the vast network of rights on property. As a 
legal device governing the control over property, it had a far-reaching effect during the centuries 
which we look back upon as the Ancien Régime. Moreover, one of the deepest fault-lines which the 
Revolution cut first through French, and subsequently European, history was precisely the 
                                                 
* I wish to thank Alain Wijffels for translating this article from original French into English. 
1 Feenstra, R., “Dominium utile est chimaera? Nouvelles réflexions sur le concept de propriété  dans le droit 
savant (à propos d’un ouvrage récent)” 66 TRG 66 (1998), pp. 381-397. 
2 In the first footnote of his article, Feenstra refers to two earlier studies of his: Feenstra, R., “Les origines du 
dominium utile chez les glossateurs (avec une appendice concernant l’opinion des ultramontani)”, originally published 
in 1971 in the Festschrift in honour of H.J. Scheltema, and later reprinted in Feenstra, R., Flores iuris romani. Etudes 
d’histoire du droit, Leiden, 1974, pp. 215-259;  the second article is Feenstra, R., “Dominium and ius in re aliena: The 
Origins of a Civil Law Distinction, first published in New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property. Essays for Barry 
Nicholas” (P. Birks, ed.), Oxford, 1989, later reprinted in Feenstra, R., Legal Scholarship and Doctrines of Private Law, 
13th-18th Centuries, London (Variorum), 1996, as essay No. III. 
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suppression of the distinction between the dominium directum and the dominium utile, and other 
legal expressions of feudal entitlements on property. 
 
The legal phrase dominium utile is commonly known to express the property rights enjoyed by the 
person to whom a fief has been granted, or as the beneficiary of another form of entitlement on the 
property which had been conveyed to him. The lord who had made the grant maintained over the 
property an entirely different kind of ownership, known as the dominium directum. The latter only 
entitled the lord to receive various forms of homage associated with the property he had conveyed, 
and to retain a power of control over the grantee. It was precisely because these terms referred to a 
society governed by feudalism that the French Revolution had abolished that system of double 
ownership, so as to reunite in the hands of a single person the legal powers to enjoy and dispose of 
the property. Ownership thus became a right which was necessarily one and indivisible. Property 
rights which could lawfully be established on goods owned by someone else were therefore 
restricted to a small number by the lawmaker, while the possibility of having two concomitant 
forms of ownership on the same property was ruled out. 
 
Since the dominium utile was now perceived as a defining feature of a legal order which had been 
demoted by the new legal constructs of the nineteenth century, no wonder it drew the attention of 
legal historians. A considerable amount of legal-historical research has been spent on the origins, 
the reasons and effects of a legal concept which proved to have played a very significant part in 
European history 3 . It was a concept which had been shaped by academic lawyers, strongly 
influenced by the new legal language which gained ground in Western Europe when Justinian’s 
compilations of Roman law were discovered. However, neither the phrase nor its legal substance 
appears in the sources of Roman law. It was certainly an invention by Medieval legal scholars and, 
making the case look even less plausible, it also contravenes a fundamental principle of classic 
Roman law, which is clearly stated in the Digest:  two individuals cannot exercise a dominium over 
the same thing at the same time (D. 13.6.5.15). When a single thing is owned by several individuals, 
Roman law considered that each owner was entitled to a notional portion of the whole, to a part of 
the value of the property. Each one is the sole owner of that notional part, although that perfect 
ownership will only materialise when the community with the other owners is dissolved. Such is the 
question of our topic for legal history: how did the glossators succeed in subverting so blatantly 
their textual authorities? 
 
                                                 
3 A full bibliography would be too long to include in the present article. A first survey of the issue may be 
found in a famous article by Meynial, E., “Notes sur la formation de la théorie du domaine divisé (domaine direct et 
domaine utile) du XIIe au XIVe siècle dans les romanistes. Étude de dogmatique juridique”, Mélanges Fitting, II, 
Montpellier, 1908, 411-461; after the Second World War, in addition to the articles by Robert Feenstra, already 
mentioned, the reader should be referred to Coing, H., “Zur Eigentumslehre des Bartolus”, Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 70 (1953), pp. 348-371. P. Grossi published two books during 
the 1960s: Locatio ad longum tempus. Locazione e rapporti reali di godimento nella problematica del diritto, Naples, 
1963, and Le situazioni reali nell’esperienza giuridica medievale, Padova, 1968, as well as several articles, which have 
been collected in Il dominio e le cose. Percezioni medievali e moderne dei diritti reali, Milano, 1992. Since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, relevant studies include: Cortese, E., “Controversie medievali sul dominio utile. 
Bartolo e il quidam doctor de Aurelianis, in Amicitiae pignus” Studies for A. Cavanna], Milano, 2003, I, 613-635; 
Heirbaut, D., “Feudal Law: the Real Ius Commune of Property in Europe, or: Should We Reintroduce Duplex 
Dominium?”, European Private Law 3 (2003), pp. 301-320, with further bibliographical references at p. 312; Rüfner, 
Th.], “The Roman Concept of Ownership and the Medieval Doctrine of Dominium Utile”, The Creation of the Ius 
Commune : From Casus to Regula (J. Cairns and P. du Plessis eds.), Edinburgh, 2010 [Edinburgh Studies in Law 7], 
pp. 127-142. ]Even more recently, on the theories developed at the School of Orléans, see Duynstee, M.C.I.M., 
L’enseignement du droit civil à l’université d’Orléans du début de la guerre des cent ans (1337) au siège de la ville 
(1428), Frankfurt, 2013 [Studien zur europ. RG, 253], pp. 155 ss. 
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When he first tackled the issue, back in 1971, Feenstra decided to approach it, metaphorically 
speaking, through its main gate. He asked the questions of the concept’s origins: who and for what 
reasons had first coined the strange phrase for the first time? Unlike his predecessors, Feenstra did 
not restrict his investigations to the earliest appearances of the phrase in those Medieval works 
which happened to have been published when the printing press was invented, or for which 
philologically minded jurists had provided critical editions in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
He also carried on his investigation in manuscripts which document the travails of the glossators on 
the sources of the civil law. That research allowed him to formulate a strongly reasoned opinion, 
based on the evidence of the source-material he had found, on the first use of the phrase. At the 
same time, Feenstra also took a critical look at the scholarly debate on the issue since the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In the discussions about the birth of the expression dominium utile, he 
recognised two schools of thought which opposed each other. The first was represented by Édouard 
Meynial, who wrote in 1908 an article in honour of Hermann Fitting which became notorious 
among legal historians: Notes sur la formation de la théorie du domaine divisé. In order to illustrate 
the opposite thesis, Feenstra drew the attention to a strongly argued essay by a German scholar, 
much less known at the time: Karl Lautz, who had published in 1916 a booklet (already written in 
1886) under the title Entwicklungsgeschichte des Dominium utile. 
 
The two authors proposed entirely different theories. For Lautz, the construct of a double ownership 
had been the result of a discussion between the first glossators of Roman law, who had been 
debating about the effects of acquisitive prescription. The sources on this debate betray a great deal 
of uncertainties on the precise nature of the right acquired by someone who had behaved as the true 
owner during the period set out by the law, and who was therefore protected by the civil law even 
though he was not the holder of the proper right of ownership. What such an individual who had the 
possession of the property could do in order to reclaim the property acquired through prescription 
was to start an actio utilis. It seemed therefore plausible that in that context, the phrase dominium 
utile had first originated. In that view, this would have been a mere academic discussion, without 
any concern for creating legal instruments adjusted to the social reality at the time. A typical 
procedural term of art (“utilis” applied to a form of action) was transposed to substantive law. 
Medieval legal science would therefore have drawn its inspiration from the internal logics of 
Roman law in order to formulate the “double dominion”, following a characteristic phrase in the 
Roman law sources. 
 
Meynial, in contrast, suggested a far more “historical” interpretation. In his view, the distinction 
between the two forms of ownership was not the result of an academic discussion centred around 
the texts of Roman law. He looked for external influences in a society deeply marked by Germanic 
institutions which he thought might have convinced the Medieval jurists to tamper with their texts 
so as to introduce a concept which was foreign to Roman law. Surprising as it may seem, it was the 
French scholar who took side along the historiographical stream of the history of German law4. 
Meynal’s thesis implied that the very strength by which the legal institution of ancestral German 
law had been able to penetrate Medieval society had led the learned academic lawyers with no other 
option but to work out a constrained, and ultimately wrong, interpretation of Roman law so as to 
ensure that Germanic legal concepts could apply. Conversely, the German scholar Lautz continued 
to follow the concept of law as a complex system of abstract rules which were formulated by jurists 
working on positive normative dicta, in order to make them intelligible in a rational system which 
was not necessarily determined by external factors.  
                                                 
4 In Lautz’ book, the idea that the duplex dominium reflected the Germanic Gewere  was mainly attributed to 
George Phillips, Gründsätze des gemeinen deutschen Privatrechts mit Einschluss des Lehnrechts, I, Berlin 1829, 237-
239. After Phillips, that idea, which was taken up by Meynial, has been supported by several German authors. 
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In the first pages of his article, Meynial openly admitted his adhesion to the ideas of Germanistic 
scholarship, in particular the writings by Otto von Gierke 5 . In order to develop his own 
investigations, Gierke had borrowed from earlier German scholarship, which, in the very context of 
property rights, had assumed the introduction by the northern Völker of a typically Germanic “legal 
idea”, that of the gewere (usually translated in French as saisine). According to this interpretation, 
the concept of gewere had deeply affected the practice, but furthermore the legal doctrines of the 
first generations of jurists during the twelfth century, who had been compelled to tamper with their 
reading of Roman law texts, so as to apply them to ancestral legal structures completely foreign to 
them6 . Meynal’s research on the origins of the phrase dominium utile was as such the latest 
development of a historiographical tradition deeply rooted in the German tradition7. 
 
The opposing theories of Lautz and Meynial provided the preliminary materials for Robert 
Feenstra’s research. The opposition was reflected and reshaped in the struggle between 
“naturalism” and “formalism”, which may be considered as two forces which have determined the 
structure of law in Europe. On the one hand, we have a law which adjusts to the requirements of the 
real world of social relations, on the other, a system governed by general and abstract rules, which, 
rather than evolving from society, have to be fitted into a priori established categories of the law 
making authority. The “naturalist” view, supported by a majority current among historians of 
Medieval law, tends to see a struggle based on the opposition between Roman law texts and 
institutions which used to be labelled as Germanic, but which nowadays are usually associated with 
customs based on usage and practice throughout Europe8.  
 
The concept of dominium utile appears therefore to be trapped between two characteristic, but 
diverging views on legal historiography, which always tends to focus more strongly on institutional 
developments, rather than on contingent historical events. In such a tradition, the constructs of legal 
science are not explained as answers to specific cases or to a historical context which is precisely 
determined in time and space, but they result from immanent historical forces, and legal doctrines 
emerge from the confrontation of these forces. It is exactly this cultural attitude that has often 
prevented legal historians from undertaking researches aiming at understanding the cultural, 
economic and social context in which legal theories were created. The theory of the double 
ownership appears to be no exception. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Feenstra, R., “Dominium utile est chimaera”, cit., p. 384, notes that “D’après Meynial, l’élément le plus 
important dans la formation du dominium utile aurait été ‘la conception foncière germanique’. Sur ce point, il s’était 
inspiré des idées d’Otto von Gierke”. 
6 One of the oldest examples of that view is to be found in Delbrück, B., Die dingliche Klage des deutschen 
Rechts, Leipzig, 1857, pp. 101-111, where the author discusses the distinction between possessio civilis and possessio 
naturalis as a construct elaborated by the glossators, strongly influenced by the Germanic gewere. Heusler, A., Die 
Gewere, Weimar, 1872, pp. 297-326, took up and further developed the interpretation of Delbrück. 
7 Conte, E., “Droit médiéval. Un débat historiographique italien”, Annales. Histoire, Sciences sociales 57/6 
(2002), pp. 1593-1613, 1601-1607. See also Conte, E., “Gewere, vestitura, spolium: un’ipotesi di interpretazione”, Der 
Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die europäische Rechtskultur, Bd. 1: Zivil- und Zivilprozessrecht (O. Condorelli, F. Roumy, 
M. Schmoeckel, eds.), Köln-Weimar-Wien, 2009, pp. 169-191. 
8 That approach is now largely outdated, see (a.o.) Reynolds, S., “Medieval Law”, The Medieval World (P. 
Linehan and J.L. Nelson, eds.), London – New York, 2001, pp. 484-502, 487: “The Roman Law on which some groups 
in Italy and elsewhere in southern Europe prided themselves was also to a large extent customary law. The old 
obsession with defining law as Roman or Germanic has come to look more and more pointless. Roman law in the 
provinces had always been different from that of the classical jurists, and the collapse of Roman government in the 
West had changed the conditions in which it worked”. 
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2. Pillius de Medicina and the birth of the dominium utile 
 
Feenstra’s detailed study published in 1971 established beyond doubt that the phrase was first 
coined by the glossator Pillius de Medicina. Twenty-five years later, Feenstra himself wrote a useful 
summary of his findings, which may here be reproduced verbatim (in English translation): 
  
“Already around the mid-twelfth century, a few glossators had been wondering if the holder of a 
right of emphytheosis, of superficy and similar rights were domini, so that somewhat vague expressions such 
as quasi dominus, aliquo modo dominus came to be used. However, the more abstract question, whether 
those individuals enjoyed a quoddam dominium, does not appear to have been asked before Pillius, who was 
the first commentator of the Libri Feudorum, during the last decade of the twelfth century”9. 
 
Feenstra also recalls the technical features which make it possible to envisage the right acquired by 
a vassal who received his fief as a dominium.  Because the feudal concession was considered in law 
as a form of conveyance, the right of the vassal was transformed into a property right which, in turn, 
could be transferred to a third party: “on the issue, whether in feudum concedere should qualify as 
an alienatio, — Feenstra writes — Pillius says that the lord dominium alienat, scilicet utile, retinet 
tamen directum, and, in the case the vassal will transfer the fief property to a vassal of his own, 
Pillius returns to the issue and acknowledges that both the first and the second vassal have the 
dominium utile” 10. 
 
That was the first use of a legal phrase which would last for many centuries. One may ponder why 
legal historians, whose area of research inevitably must raise their interest for the history of legal 
formulations, are not wont to extend a similar interest for the relevant historical circumstances 
surrounding the turning-points in their historical field. In this case, the lack of interest is all the 
more striking, because Pillius’ personal history and the political circumstances of the city where he 
was active as a professional lawyer are well known and documented.  
 
He was born in Medicina, a village near Bologna where he read law. He became a professor in his 
Alma Mater around 117711. In an autobiographical aside, he mentions that after having taught for 
three years at Bologna, the council of the city of Modena invited him to move to their town and to 
establish a new law school. The offer was so attractive that he decided to leave his chair in Bologna 
and to transfer his activities to the aspiring competitor, however comparatively small that city was. 
His name appears in Modena’s records from 1181 onwards, and regularly occurs until 1207.  
 
In Modena, Pillius suggested a few major innovations in law teaching. In his Libellus disputatorius, 
he proposed to his students to abandon the useless apparatus glossarum and to focus instead on the 
texts of the corpus iuris civilis so as to learn how to draw out from these texts the arguments that 
would allow them to discuss legal issues dialectically12. He could never have put forward such a 
                                                 
9 Feenstra, “Dominium utile”, p. 386. 
10 Ibidem. Feenstra here refers to Pilius’ gloss on LLFF 2.3 rebus suis, published by Rota, A., “L’apparato di 
Pillio alle Consuetudines feudorum e il ms. 1004 dell’Arch. di Stato di Roma”, St. e mem. per la storia dell’Univ. di 
Bologna, 14 (1938), pp. 104-105, num. 127. The same text can be found in the Accursian gloss, at the same place. Thus, 
the idea that a feudal concession was a form of conveyance was generally adopted once the standard gloss started 
spreading in the Latin West. 
11 On Pillius’ life, see now the entries in Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani, Bologna 2013, by E. 
Cortese (vol. II, pp. 1587-1590), and in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Rome 2016, by E. Conte (also available on-
line). 
12 See the prooemium of the Libellus, published by Belloni, A., Le questioni civilistiche del secolo XII: da 
Bulgaro a Pillio da Medicina, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1989, 54: “Surgite, surgite, surgite quasi de sompno scolares tepidi, 
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radical proposal in Bologna, the home-town of glossators and their apparatus. Nor would he have 
been able to introduce in Bologna another momentous change: the study of a text of customary law 
in a law school dedicated to Roman law. And yet, that is what he did with the compilation of feudal 
customs by the Milanese judge Obertus de Orto. The teaching of feudal law was exceedingly 
innovative. No Bologna educated jurist before him had ever written a sequence of glosses on a text 
which was not anointed with statutory authority. The glosses on the Libri Feudorum, however, dealt 
with a text which consisted mainly in a treatise on feudal customs written down by a judge who did 
not even claim to act as a lawmaker. In the margins of that treatise, Pillius’ glosses were the first to 
build a network of references to Roman law, which was the primary concern of law teachers and 
students13. That network of connections between the customs written down by Obertus, imperial 
constitutions issued by Medieval rulers and Roman laws, opened the path for the Libri Feudorum to 
be quoted by the glossators, and within a few decades to make their triumphal entry in the standard 
version of the corpus iuris civilis including the Accursian gloss14. 
 
The encounter between feudal customs and Roman law was therefore one of the influential 
innovations introduced by Pillius after his move from Bologna to Modena. A good example is the 
gloss which mentions the dominium utile. It sets out to explain a passage from the Libri Feudorum 
(2.3) according to which someone who is not entitled to transfer the ownership of his property is not 
entitled either to transfer the property through a feudal investiture. The gloss therefore raises the 
practical question, if an heir is given a real property with the qualification that he will not be able to 
sell it, can he still convey it as a fief? In order to answer that question, Pillius addresses the issue of 
the legal nature of the conveyance by referring to two texts in Justinian’s Code. Firstly, C.4.51.7 
states that the prohibition of selling includes all other forms of disposal, such as creating a hypothec 
or pledging assets as surety. Therefore, under the generic term of disposal of property, different 
types of legal operations are included, not only a contract of sale. What is the common thread 
uniting those different operations? Here again, one has to turn to a text of the Code which offers a 
general definition: “Est autem alienatio omnis actus per quem dominium transfertur” (C. 5.23.1). 
The investiture is therefore a legal device through which dominium is being transferred. The vassal 
receives a dominium utile, while the lord keeps the dominium directum15. That is the reason, Pillius 
notes, why in the case where a vassal has been lawfully given possession of his fief through an 
investiture, he will be able to protect his right with a property claim (rei vindicatio) in the form of 
an actio utilis, whereas the direct property claim will remain the prerogative of his lord, who retains 
the dominium directum. The reasoning is characteristically a learned legal construct relying at the 
same time on a customary authority and on a Roman law authority, in order to achieve a 
rationalisation of feudal relations within the established framework of the rules applied by academic 
jurists. 
 
 
3. The historical context of doctrinal innovations  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
multiplici scriptorum fere imbuti, et textum, maxime trium voluminum Institutionum, Digestorum et Codicis, superfluis 
scilicet apparatibus reiectis, lectitate…”. 
13 Rota, A., “L’apparato di Pillio alle Consuetudines feudorum e il ms. 1004 dell’Arch. di Stato di Roma”, St. e 
mem. per la storia dell’Univ. di Bologna, 14 (1938), pp. 61-103. 
14 For this case, see Cortese, E., Il rinascimento giuridico medievale, 2nd revised edition, Rome, 1996, pp. 50-
52. 
15 Rota, “L’apparato”, p. 105: “… alienatione omnis actus continetur, per quem dominium transfertur, ut C. de 
fundo do. l. 1 (C. 5.23.1). Respondeo: falsum est, immo dominium alienat, scilicet utile, retinet tamen directum, unde 
utilis et non directa vindicatio datur…”. 
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The specific political and economic context of the construct of dominium utile is that of the city of 
Modena, the town which succeeded in luring Pillius from nearby Bologna by offering him an 
attractive salary and, as Pillius himself informs us, by contributing to pay off the debts that the 
young scholar had accumulated in his home town. Moreover, as Bolognese professors had to 
promise under oath that they would not teach elsewhere for a period of three years, Modena paid 
out his salary during two years, even though this meant that Pillius was unable to take on any 
teaching.  
 
At the time, Modena was a city in full expansion. During the 1170s, it had strengthened its relations 
with the anti-imperial party in the communal wrangle against Frederic Barbarossa. Peace treaties 
with other communes provided for mutual military aid. Other treaties, with small neighbouring 
communities, secured Modena’s ascendancy over the city’s surrounding territory. 
 
The records of privileges16  of the municipality contain the most important official documents 
produced by the city government and provide evidence of the city’s diplomatic efforts. However, in 
those records dealing with the subordination of the rural population, of treaties with large and small 
cities, one single document deals with the rights of Modena’s citizens on their own property. It is a 
document which the city regarded as a foundational act of the community’s economic life. 
Ludovico Antonio Muratori, who was the first to publish the text in 1740, commented that it was an 
enactment still in force at Modena in his own days17.  
 
The document, dated from 1182, testifies to an agreement made between the city’s government and 
the most important local ecclesiastical authorities about the legal status of goods belonging to 
ecclesiastical institutions which citizens of the city held by virtue of a concession. The agreement 
followed an arbitration which the parties had assented to in order to put an end to disputes between 
them. The bishop, the canons of the principal church, the abbot of the monastery of Saint Peter and 
the abbess of the monastery of Sant’Eufemia had complained against the Commune of Modena 
because of a new “municipal statute” which, they claimed, was harmful to their interests. The 
statute not only dealt with the land of their institutions, but also with that of other real estate owners 
in the city18.  
 
The text of the new statute under discussion is fully reported in the document. It contains some very 
precise rules about the rights of those who possessed houses and land within the city’s perimeter 
and its immediate surroundings. They were allowed to convey them freely, as long as the rents due 
to the owner were secured19. If the concession had been granted in the form of a fief, which would 
normally have implied that it was only transferrable to male heirs, the daughters, according to this 
                                                 
16 Registrum privilegiorum Comunis Mutinae, (L. Simeoni and E.P. Vicini, eds.); Reggio Emilia, 1940. 
17 Muratori, L.A., Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi, vol. III, diss. 36 (de emphyteusibus, precariis et laicorum 
decimis), coll. 149-156. In his introduction to his transcript, the famous clergyman, both historian and jurist, shows that 
he was perfectly aware of the legal importance of the distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile as it 
was applied in that document: “Saepe lites effervebant inter episcopos et clerum mutinensem ac cives, emphyteuseon 
caussa, contendentibus iis hos aut ob pensionem non solutam aut ob mortem alicuius, aut alias ob caussas, excidisse a 
iure suo ac fundos directis dominis esse restituendos. Contra nitebantur cives. Quare post diuturnam certamen ad istam 
concordiam deventum est, quae adhuc in civitate nostra viget” (col. 150). 
18 Registrum, cit., 78: “Cum lis et controversia esset inter comune et populum Mutine ex una parte et dominum 
Arditionem episcopum et dominum Bonefacium prepositum et canonicos ecclesie maioris pro ecclesia, et dominum 
Michaelem abbatem sancti Petri, et dominam Mariam abbatissam sancte Euphomie pro ecclesiis suis ex alia de lege 
municipali et ordinamento civitatis et populi  quam constituerant tam in terris predictarum ecclesiarum quam aliorum 
hominum…”. 
19 Ibidem: “qui habent vel habebunt domos vel casamenta in civitate Mutine vel extra infra hos fines … possint 
ea, salva domini pensione, quomodocumque voluerint dare”. 
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statute, were entitled to inherit those properties if there were no male heirs. Further feudal 
concessions remained of course possible, as long as the newly created vassals acknowledged the 
rights of the original owner20. In such a case, if the first vassal died without heirs, the lord could not 
reclaim his land, which remained granted to the sub-vassal on the same terms for the rent due21. 
 
These rules on property held in fief applied to a large number of land and houses within the city, for 
the diocese had for several decades pursued a policy of granting real property in the form of fiefs so 
as to reinforce its influence on the city’s population22. Moreover, much land and many houses had 
been granted in the form of precharia, which was the Church institutions’ favourite form of 
concession. The son of the author of the Libri Feudorum’s main part, Anselmus (or Anselminus) de 
Orto, briefly mentions that form in an elementary work, which proves nonetheless to follow closely 
legal practice23. The author explains that because the churches were not allowed to transfer the 
ownership of their land to anyone, they often granted their real property “precario”, whereby a rent 
was to be paid. Contracts were made up in writing and did not operate beyond the third generation. 
On the other hand, they could be renewed by agreement between the parties24. The licensees’ rights 
of inheritance were sometimes restricted to male heirs, but sometimes extended to women25. 
The Modenese statute of 1182 regulated these concessions just as favourably on behalf of the 
grantees as in the case of fiefs. The grantor’s freedom of choice was even more limited, for when 
the concession in the form of precharia terminated, it was automatically renewed at a price fixed by 
law26. If the contract provided that the inheritance was to be restricted to male heirs (as Anselmus 
noted), the provision was subject to a compulsory amendment by the city. As a result, even against 
the will of the grantor expressed in the contract establishing the precharia, women could also 
inherit the property in the absence of male heirs27. 
 
The extension of the rights devolved to the grantees can also be observed in the case of property 
held in the form of livellus, another contract widely used for granting goods belonging to the 
church. Anselminus quite naturally also deals with it in his small treatise, just after the precharia. 
The livellus’ duration was supposed to be limited to 29 years, but a renewal of the grant could be 
                                                 
20 Ibidem: “et ut qui habent vel habebunt domos vel casamenta in civitate vel extra infra predictos fines per 
feudum, succedat filia femina si masculus desierit in predicto feodo, et possint ea quomodocumque voluerint alii 
concedere, dum tamen non per proprium”.  
21 Ibidem: “Et si ille qui concessit domum vel casamentum quod habebat per feudum sine filiis decesserit, 
dominus non possit auferre predictum feudum, set recipiat quod vasallus erat solitus recipere”.  
22 Rölker, R., Nobiltà e comune a Modena. Potere e amministrazione nei secoli XII e XIII, Modena, 1997 
(updated Italian translation of the original German version of 1994), p. 3 and p. 27. 
23 Anselminus de Orto, Super contractibus emphyteosis et precarii et libelli atque investiture (R. Jacobi, ed.), 
Weimar, 1854. On Anselmus, see now the entry Anselmo dell’Orto, by E. Cortese, in Dizionario biografico dei giuristi 
italiani (Birocchi, Cortese, Mattone et Miletti, eds.), Bologna, 2013, pp. 77-78. 
24 Anselminus, op. cit., pp. 15-16: “Plerumque enim ecclesiae, quia non possunt dominium suarum rerum in 
alios transferre, certa pensione constituta solent aliis precario concedere: antiquitus enim precibus tantum dabantur, 
hodie vero pretio sine damno ecclesiae, in scriptis conceduntur, ita ut non transgrediantur tertiam generationem. Sed 
tamen ex pacto possunt renovari”. 
25  Ibidem: “Quomodo in hoc contractu succedatur videndum est. Plerumque enim ecclesiae solent hoc 
precarium concedere ita ut masculi tantum succedant, quandoque ut masculi et feminae. Prius tamen masculi quam 
feminis defertur, et ideo quandoque masculi tantum succedunt, quandoque masculi et feminae”. 
26 Registrum, cit., p. 78: “Item ordinaverunt cives Mutine ut finita precharia dominus cogatur eam renovare pro 
decem sol. unumquemque iugerum infra predictos fines; extra vero illos fines cogatur dominus renovare bubulcam pro 
duobus sol.” 
27 Ibidem, p. 79: “Item ordinaverunt in prechariis quod si precharius decedat sine illis heredibus qui debent 
succedere per pactum precharie, tunc femine ex eo descendentes succedant sicut masculi deberent succedere predicto 
modo renovandi eis servato”. 
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agreed in the original contract28. The statute of 1182 applied to livelli some of the same provisions 
already established for fiefs and prechariae. For all three forms of grants, the statute added that if 
the grantee failed to pay the rent, he would not lose his right, but would be bound to pay twice the 
amount, in addition to the costs incurred by the owner in order to recover the money due to him29. 
However, if the owner delayed the renewal of a grant, he would be admonished by the city 
authorities. If he failed to answer after the third admonishment, the grant was to be automatically 
renewed30. 
 
This summary of the transcript of the statute appears at the beginning of the document which 
includes the agreement between the ecclesiastical lords and the city following arbitration 
proceedings. The arbitrators ruled that the new statute would remain in force, but they also allowed 
for a compensation in favour of the churches. Evidently, under this new system (which, as Muratori 
testified, was still in force at Modena in his lifetime31) the owners’ rights, who a few years later 
would be styled by Pillius as domini directi, were diminished. The newly confirmed rules were 
favourable to the lay citizens of Modena and fostered their material well-being. The real property 
rights which they had obtained through grants from the great ecclesiastical landlords were now 
much more secure, while the landlords enjoyed much less leeway than before. 
 
 
4. The legal rule within and outside its historical context  
 
An analytical reading of the statutory rule of 1182 therefore offers a fairly accurate picture of the 
social and economic forces active in Modena at a time when the political power of the city was 
growing. The statute was passed between the victory of the communes over the emperor at Legnano 
in 1176 and the so-called ‘peace of Constance’ of 1183, which was an imperial constitution in 
which the emperor recognised the powers of self-government to the Northern Italian cities. During 
those years, land in municipal Italy became a much sought-after commodity: it was much better 
managed and conveyancing of land multiplied32. Precisely during the same period, Pillius left 
Bologna, his alma mater studiorum, in order to found a new and innovative law school at Modena. 
There, he worked out the doctrine of divided ownership, which, as we have seen, would have a 
profound influence on the legal construct of ownership until the French Revolution.  
 
The analysis of the text shows that it was a turning point in the history of legal ideas, which 
occurred in the middle of major changes implemented by statute law, which, in turn, reflected the 
ascendancy of a new political power. The town’s citizenship who held that power exercised 
pressure so as to secure their rights on land which had been granted to them, but without acquiring 
an absolute title. 
                                                 
28 Anselmus, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
29 Registrum, cit., p. 79: “Et ut in omnibus suprascriptis capitulis non amittat quis ius suum eo quod aliquo 
tempore steterit quod non solverit pensionem, set teneatur eam duplare; et si dominus in petenda pensionem aliquas 
expensas fecerit sive in advocato proprio sive comuni vel iudici, ille qui debuit eam solvere omnes illa expensas 
resarciet quas prdictus dominus occasione pensionis sine fraude suo iuramento monstraverit se fecisse”. 
30 Ibidem: “et si predicti domini tam clerici quam laici predictas precharias et libellos renovare distulerint ut 
suprascriptorum est postquam requisiti fuerint a prechario vel libellario vel eorum nuntio et trina denuntiatione facta per 
rectorem civitatis vel eius nuntium, perinde habeatur ac si precharia vel libellus renovatus fuisset, nec interim donec 
renovet teneatur pensionem prestare, ita tamen ut quandocumque voluerit ei renovare cogatur precharius vel libellarius 
solvere predictam in renovatione cautelam, scilicet octo sol. vel decem pro iugero, ut suprascriptum est”. 
31 Supra, note 17. 
32  Cammarosano, P., “La situazione economica del Regno d’Italia all’epoca di Federico Barbarossa”, 
Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo 96 (1990), pp. 157-173, 160. 
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Pillius insisted exactly on that issue. According to him, the rights which the grantees had obtained 
as a fief, a precharia or livellus could qualify in law as a form of ownership, a dominium. His bold 
move promoting the Libri Feudorum as a legal authority on the same footing as Justinian’s 
sacratissimae leges becomes much more intelligible in the light of the circumstances which led to 
the adoption of the statute in the city which employed him. The statute was the result of the city 
authorities’ political and diplomatic display of strength which aimed at changing radically the 
balance of power between the major ecclesiastical institutions and the large body of “bourgeois” 
families who formed the commune of Modena. 
 
The theory of double ownership should therefore not be understood as a jurisprudential 
“awakening” to a typically Medieval balance of interests. Nor did the learned jurists simply draw 
from the Roman legal vocabulary a terminology which allowed them to “dress up” a reality which 
legal historians used to view as “Germanic”, but would call today “customary”, and which was 
supposedly derived from facts or social mentality. Legal historians have since then highlighted the 
uncertainties around such “mentality”, particularly in feudal relations. Already in 1983, Gérard 
Giordanengo noted: “It is exceedingly hazardous to argue the existence of a feudal mentality”33. 
 
A proper historical recontextualization of the law shows that Pillius’ doctrinal construct was part of 
a contingent historical chain of events which included, among the information which is the 
historical subject-matter of our research, the legal innovation carried out, in this particular case, by a 
combination of legal science and statutory initiative. In Modena, in an entirely specific economic 
and political context, a two-fold innovation was carried out in order to meet the demands of those 
classes of society who held land and were becoming increasingly powerful in the city’s political 
community. In the first place, they sought to protect their rights on land within and outside the city 
walls. The new statute radically changed the nature of the traditional concessions of land. The 
“municipal law” (as our text defines it) would be referred to as “custom” the following year in the 
peace of Constance. However, it was in no way the statutory expression of some ancient customary 
institution which was endorsed by a state of fact and the lapse of time34. On the contrary, the statute 
completely reshaped the traditional legal relationship, as it carried through the equivalent of an 
expropriation of the lordship’s rights in favour of the vassals and other grantees. In that sense, the 
old liberal historiography interpreted the “customs” of the Italian cities in such a way that the 
experience of the late-Medieval communes was represented as a first bourgeois revolution against 
the nobility35. In fact, far from expressing an ancient local tradition, the city’s statutes were intended 
to bring major changes in the social balance of interests. The statutes of the Italian cities introduced 
new rules against customary enserfment, against the privileges enjoyed by the nobility and the 
clergy, and it favoured an allocation of land property which would heed the individual rights of the 
citizens.  
 
                                                 
33 Giordanengo, G., “La féodalité”, La France médiévale (J. Favier, ed.), Paris, 1983, now in Giordanengo, G., 
Féodalités et droits savants dans le Midi médiéval, Aldershot (Variorum), 1992, num. XIII, p. 187. 
34 The reforming purpose of Medieval customs was already highlighted by Gouron, A., “La coutume en France 
au Moyen Age”, Recueils de la société Jean Bodin 52,2, La coutume, Bruxelles, 1990, pp. 193–217, now in Gouron A., 
Droit et coutume en France aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Aldershot (Variorum), 1993, XXI: “L’apparent respect… vis-à-vis 
de l’ancienneté des usages ne doit pas tromper: il s’agit bel et bien d’un nouveau droit, dont on chercherait en vain 
de lointains précédents” (p. 201). 
35 See for example Quinet, E., Les Révolutions d’Italie, Paris, 1848, p. 50 and passim. A few additional 
remarks in Conte, E., “Res publica. Il modello antico, la politica e il diritto nel XII secolo”, Iuris Historia. Liber 
amicorum Gero Dolezalek (V. Colli and E. Conte, eds.), Berkeley, 2008, pp. 193-212, 194-195. 
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While the historians of Germanic law focused their energy on demonstrating that what was not 
Roman had to be the unrestrainable emergence of very ancient legal institutions enrooted in the 
German hearts of the people, the vision of the French liberal historians was still successful among 
Italian historians of the Risorgimento. The statute of 1182, still in force in the 14th century, was 
considered by its editor in 1864 as a manifestation of the revenge of the bourgeois class against 
clergy and nobility36. 
 
The doctrinal interpretation of the double ownership, which has inspired so many studies among 
legal historians, was therefore much more a rebalancing act than a fresh “awareness” of structures 
rooted in Medieval mentality. Pillius, who was employed by the city authorities to teach Roman 
law, worked out the dominium utile in order to frame into a bold and successful legal theory what 
the holders of grants on land had obtained through local statute law. 
 
The case should be a reminder to legal historians that they should never neglect the evidence of 
legal practice. The document of 1182 is not a recent discovery. It was published more than 250 
years ago in the main collection of Medieval Italian sources, Muratori’s Antiquitates, and it was 
also published in 1940, as part of the file of records in which it had been included37. It was 
mentioned in several historical studies on Modena, the first time by Tiraboschi in 179338, and 
recently by Rölker39. It is therefore a well-known document. Yet, research by legal historians never 
gave that statute of Modena further attention. Since Meynial’s article of 1908 had already shown 
that the origins of the phrase dominium utile could be traced back to Pillius, the lack of interest for 
the available source-material on the city where Pillius was working betrays a common attitude in 
legal historiography. Legal historians still often tend to be guided by some bygone intellectual 
evolutionism, and fail to take a closer look at the historical context in which legal innovations took 
place. They rather focus their attention on the legal works by jurists, where they look for evidence 
of doctrinal “progress” which they seek within legal literature. Thus, the old tradition of the 
“internal legal history”40 continues influencing their research.  
 
On the other hand, one needs to emphasise that historical contingency is certainly not the only 
dimension of legal history. Doctrinal constructs obviously occur as a sequel to a particular situation, 
in order to meet historically clearly identifiable needs of a society in which lawyers operate. 
Doctrinal concepts are nevertheless intellectual entities which can be severed from the historical 
contingency which inspired them, so as to serve the needs of an entirely different kind, in a very 
different context from that where they were produced. The case of the dominium utile is probably 
one of the best examples, because, as we have seen, it has been adopted on a large scale by ius 
commune doctrine. However, the learned doctrine of feudal law as a whole is no doubt the best 
illustration of that second attitude of the law confronted with the passing of time. The law is apt to 
elaborate general rules which make it events which reflect the relationship between men and things. 
That artificial uniformity, reached through the formulation of general rules, sometimes succeeds in 
determining the historical narrative. Precisely with regard to feudal relations and property, that 
influence of the categories of civil law scholarship on historiography has been questioned as a 
                                                 
36 Statuta civitatis Mutine (anno 1327 reformata), (C. Campori, ed.), Parma, 1864 [Mon. di storia patria delle 
provincie modenesi, serie degli statuti, T. 1]. The statute of 1327 re-affirmed a statute of 1221, itself essentially a 
repetition of our law of 1182. The document of 1221 is printed on pp. 332-337 (rubr. LX of Book III). For more liberal-
minded remarks, see Cesare Campori’s introduction on pp. CXIV-CXV. 
37 Registrum privilegiorum, op.cit., pp. 78-83. 
38 Tiraboschi, G., Memorie storiche modenesi…, Modena, 1793, pp. 199-200.  
39 Nobiltà e comune, op. cit., p. 182. 
40 Conte, E., “Storia interna e storia esterna. Il diritto medievale da Francesco Calasso alla fine del XX secolo”, 
Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune 17 (2006, but 2007), pp. 299-322. 
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central theme in Susan Reynold’s work41. When the fief is envisaged as a legal institution, a caveat 
is required, for the old habit which consists in regarding doctrinal constructs as the expression of a 
customary (possibly “Germanic”) legal tradition, deeply rooted in the history of European nations, 
has influenced the traditional historical reading. When Reynolds insists on the many variations of 
feudal relations which appears from the historical evidence, and on the difficulty of encapsulating 
those variations in the legal designation of a “fief”, she calls the unifying effect of legal categories 
into question. The historian’s attention for the proper facts feels as unsatisfactory the broadness of 
general legal categories. Each document brings its own singular evidence, because any general use 
of terms of art used in practice would be tantamount to a superstructure imposed from above by 
some legal constructivism alien to historical research42. History, Reynold reminds us, can only be 
practised with an eye for contingency. 
  
Moreover, the case of the dominium utile proved that the doctrinal innovation which produces 
general definitions applicable in various contexts, is itself a product of history. Pillius would 
probably never have introduced his definition of ownership if he had not happened to work in that 
particular place at that particular time. His ability to meet the particular needs of his time was the 
key to the success of the new theory. The rapid and efficient spread of the jurisprudential 
vocabulary in feudal matters became necessary at a time when the ecclesiastical, royal and local 
institutions introduced rational proceedings, which followed an established order that was based on 
the legal classification of the case in dispute. Such a classification, from which depends the way that 
the case before the court will be handled in legal terms, inevitably applies general categories. It is 
based on the regulae established by legal doctrine in order to apply them to contingent situations 
which may be remote in time and in space from the circumstances prevailing where and when the 
rule was produced43.  
 
The abstraction of legal definitions from their context is therefore necessary for the way they can 
operate in rational legal proceedings. In the historical context of each litigation, singular and non-
repeatable events proper to the individual case determine the interaction. At the same time, we 
recognise the ability, which is also fully historical, of reordering those events in general categories, 
according to which the law will enforce or deny a person’s rights, the duties to give or to do 
something, the right to receive or to enjoy something. This was especially true in the case of feudal 
law, which circulated throughout Europe through its use in practice.  
 
As Dirk Heirbaut has remarked44, the lawyer could leave to specialist researchers the study of that 
historical contingency evidenced in historical source-material, and concentrate instead his attention 
to legal scholarship. That may be a somewhat exaggerated viewpoint, because the example of the 
present contribution has shown that the historical research of the moment when a legal doctrine is 
being elaborated may help us to understand its significance. The historical character of law 
nonetheless shares with other “histories pertaining to knowledge” a common feature: intellectual 
doctrines which are developed in a specific historical context do not always cease to exist when the 
contingent circumstances which produced them disappear in the course of social changes. On the 
contrary, what statutes, doctrines, legal practice generated in order to a contingent reality will 
transcend those particular circumstances and remain part of the tool-box which can be used by 
                                                 
41 Reynolds, S., Fiefs and Vassals. The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted, Oxford, 1994. 
42 See, inter alia, the review by F. Cheyette in Speculum 71 (1996), pp. 998-1006. 
43 See Conte, E., “Ordo iudicii et regula iuris: Bulgarus et les origines de la culture juridique (XIIème siècle)”, 
Frontières des savoirs en Italie à l'époque des premières universités (XIIe-XVe s.) (J. Chandelier and A. Robert, eds.), 
Rome, Ecole Française de Rome, 2015, pp. 155-176. 
44 Loc. cit. (supra, note 3). 
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intellectuals in a completely different historical context, perhaps very remote from time and place of 
their first origins. That is how the definition of the right of a grantee as dominus utilis, which was 
first worked out at Modena for the reasons which become intelligible through the document of 
1182, was the beginning of a remarkable success-story in later centuries. 
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